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Summary findings
Crony capitalism  and international  creditors'  self-  Earlier  studies  indicated  that a country  with a capital
fulfilling  expectations  are often suggested  as rival  inflow  structure  is more likely  to run into a currency
explanations  for currency  crises.  A possible  link between  crisis  down the road (partly  through international
the two has  not been explored.  creditors'  self-fulfilling  expectations).
Wei shows  one channel  through which  crony  Therefore, crony  capitalism,  through its effect  on the
capitalism  can increase  the chance  of a currency/financial  composition  of a country's  capital  inflows,  makes  the
crisis  by altering  the composition  of capital  inflows.  country  more vulnerable  to currency  crises  brought
Using  data on bilateral  foreign  direct investment  and  about by self-fulfilling  expectations.  Corruption may  also
bilateral  bank loans,  Wei finds clear evidence  that in  weaken  domestic  financial  supervision,  with  a subsequent
corrupt countries  the composition  of capital inflows  is  deterioration  in the quality  in banks' and firms' balance
relatively  light  in foreign  direct investment.  sheets.
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The recent currency crises in East Asia, Russia, and Latin America have
stimulated the research on the causes of currency crises. On the one hand, it is
increasingly common to hear assertions that the so-called crony capitalism may be partly
responsible for the onset and/or the depth of the crises.  [There is virtually no systematic
evidence on this so far, one way or the other. 1]  On the other hand, many researchers
argue that the (fragile) self-fulfilling expectations by international creditors are the real
reason for the currency crisis.  Crony capitalism and self-fulfilling expectations are
typically presented as rival explanations.
There may be a linkage between the two explanations. This paper investigates a
particular channel through which crony capitalism increases the chance of a future
currency crisis driven by self-fulfilling expectations. Specifically, the extent of
corruption in a country may affect that country's composition of capital inflows in a way
that makes it more vulnerable to international creditors' shifts in their self-fulfilling
expectations. Corruption here refers to the extent to which firms (or private citizens)
need to pay bribes to government officials in their interactions (for permits, licenses,
loans, and so forth). 2
Several studies (starting with Frankel and Rose 1996, followed by Radlet and
Sachs 1998, and Rodrik and Velasco 1999) have shown that the composition of
international capital inflows is correlated with incidence of currency crises. In particular,
the lower the share of foreign direct investment in total capital inflow, or the higher the
short-term debt to reserve ratio, the more likely a country may run into a currency crisis.
One possible reason for this is that bank lending or other portfolio investment may be
more sentiment-driven than direct investment. Hence, a small (unfavorable) change in
' For recent  surveys  of the literature  on corruption  and  economic  development,  see Bardhan  (1997),
Kaufmnamn  (1997),  and Wei (1999). None  of the survey  covers  any empirical  study  that  links crony
capitalism  with currency  crisis.
2 We use the term  "crony  capitalism"  interchangeably  with  "corruption."  Strictly  speaking,  "crony
capitalism" refers to an economic environment in which relatives and friends of government officials are
placed in positions of power and government decisions on allocation of resources are distorted to favor
friends and relatives.  In reality, "crony capitalism" ahmost  always implies a widespread corruption as
private firms and citizens in such an environment fimd  it necessary to pay bribes to government officials in
order to get anything done.
lthe recipient countries' fundamentals may cause a large swing in the portfolio capitals
(e.g., from massive inflows to massive outflows). This can strain the recipient country's
currency or financial system sufficiently to cause or exacerbate its collapse (Radelet and
Sachs 1998, Rodrik and Velasco 1999, and Reisen 1999).
To see the differences in the volatility of various types of capital flows, we
compute the standard deviations of three ratios (portfolio capital inflow/GDP, borrowing-
from-banks/GDP, and inward FDI/GDP) during 1980-96 for every member country of
the IMF for which data on all three variables are available.  Table 1 presents a summary
of the results.  We see that for the subset of OECD countries (with membership up to
1980), the volatility of FDI/GDP ratio is substantially smaller than the other two ratios.
For non-OECD countries as a group, the FDI/GDP ratio is also much less volatile than
the loanlGDP ratio, although it is higher than the portfolio flow/GDP ratio.  The lower
part of the same table presents the volatility of the three ratios for a number of individual
countries that featured prominently in the recent currency crises.  Each country shows a
loan/GDP ratio that is at least twice and as much as fifteen times as volatile as the
FDl/GDP ratio.  For each of these countries, the portfolio capital/GDP ratio is also more
volatile than the FDI/GDP ratio. If we extend the sample period to include the last two
years, the differences in volatility would be even more pronounced (not reported).
Therefore, the data is consistent with the hypothesis that FDI is less sentiment-driven and
hence more stable as a source of foreign capital.
This paper studies the connection between the degree of corruption in capital-
receiving countries and the composition of capital flows into these countries. In
particular, we focus on the size of bilateral direct investment versus that of bilateral bank
lending from 13 developed countries to 30 developing and transition economies.  [As we
are not able to obtain data on non-bank portfolio investment on a bilateral basis, we leave
them out of this examination.]
Corruption is bad for both international direct investors and creditors. Corrupt
borrowing countries are more likely to default on bank loans, or to nationalize (or
otherwise diminish the value of) the assets of foreign direct investors.  When this
happens, there is a limit on how much international arbitration or court proceedings can
2help to recover the assets, as there is a limit on how much collateral the foreign creditors
or direct investors can seize as compensation. 3
One may argue that domestic investors have an infornational  advantage over
international investors. Among international investors, international direct investors may
have an informational advantage over international portfolio investors (and presumably
banks).  International direct investors could obtain more information about the local
market by having managers from the headquarters stationing in the country that they
invest in. As a consequence, the existence of cross-border informational asymmetry may
lead to a bias in favor of international direct investment. This is the logic underlying
Razin, Sadka and Yuen's theory of (1998) of "pecking order of international capital
flows."  However, the existence of corruption could temper with this effect.  The need for
international investors to pay bribery and deal with extortion by corrupt bureaucrats tends
to increase with the frequency and the extent of their interactions with local bureaucrats.
Given that international direct investors are more likely to have repeated interactions with
local officials (for permits, taxes, health inspections, and so forth) than international
banks or portfolio investors, local corruption would be more detrimental to FDI than
other forms of capital flows. Along the same line, direct investment involves greater
sunk cost than bank loans or portfolio investment. Once an investment is made, when
corrupt local officials start to demand bribery (in exchange for not setting up obstacles),
direct investors would be in a weaker bargaining position than international banks or
portfolio investors. This ex post disadvantage of FDI would make international direct
investors more cautious ex ante in a corrupt host country than international portfolio
4 investors.
There is a second reason for why international direct investment is deterred more
by local corruption than international bank credit or portfolio investment.  The current
international financial architecture is such that international creditors are more likely to
be bailed out than international direct investors. For example, during the Mexican (and
subsequent Tequila) crisis and the more recent Asian currency crisis, the IMF, the World
3 In the old days,  major  international  creditors  and  direct  investors  might  rely on their  navies to invade  a
defauting  countries  to seize more  collateral. Such  is no longer  a (ready)  option  today.
4  Tornell  (1990)  presented  a model  in which  a combination  of sunk  cost in  real investment  and  uncertainty
leads  to under-investment  in real  projects  even  when  the inflow  of financial  capital  is abundant.
3Bank, and the G7 countries mobilized a large amount of funds for these countries to
prevent or minimize the potentially massive defaults on bank loans.  So an international
bailout of the bank loans in an event of a massive crisis has by now been firmly in market
expectations.  [In addition, many developing country governments implicitly or explicitly
guarantee the loans borrowed by the private sector in the country. 5] In comparison, there
have are no comparable examples of international assistance packages for the recovery of
nationalized or extorted assets of foreign direct investors except for an insignificant
amount of insurance that is often expensive to acquire. This difference further tilts the
composition of capital flows and makes banks more willing than direct investors to do
business with corrupt countries.
Both reasons suggest the possibility that corruption may affect the composition of
capital inflows in such a way that the country is more likely to experience a currency
crisis.  Of course, the composition of capital flows impacts economic development in
ways that go beyond its effect on the propensity for a currency crisis.  Indeed, many
would argue that attracting FDI as opposed to international bank loans or portfolio
investment is a more useful way to transfer technology and managerial know-how.
As some concrete examples, table 2 shows the total amount of inward foreign
direct investment, foreign bank loans, portfolio capital inflows, and their ratios for New
Zealand, Singapore, Uruguay and Thailand. On the one hand, New Zealand and
Singapore (are perceived to) have relatively low corruption (the exact source is explained
in the next section) and relatively low loan/FDI and portfolio investment/FDI ratios.  On
the other hand, Uruguay and Thailand (are perceived to) have relatively high corruption
and relatively high loan/FDI and portfolio investment/FDI ratios.  So these examples are
consistent with the notion that local corruption is correlated with patterns of capital
inflows.  Of course, these four countries are just examples.  As such, there are two
questions that need to be addressed more formally. First, does the association between
corruption and composition of capital flows generalize beyond these four countries?
Second, once we control for a number of other characteristics that affect the composition
'McKinmon  and Pill (1996  and 1999)  argue that  the gover.niment  guarantee  generates  "moral  hazard"  which
in tum leads the developing countries to "overborrow" from the international credit market.
4of capital inflows, would we still find the positive association between corruption and the
loan/FDI ratio?
We organize the rest of the paper in the following way.  Section 2 presents a
simple model that shows how corruption may affect the composition of capital flows.
Section 3 describes the data.  Section 4 presents the methodology and the statistical
results of the analyses. And Section 5 concludes.
2.  A Minimalist Model
In this section, a simple two-period model is used to demonstrate how corruption
in a country may affect the composition of its capital flows. For simplicity, let us
consider that there are two types of international capital flows: direct investment and
bank credit.
Let us suppose that the government in the capital-importing country, k,
maximizes the following two-period objective function:
U[G(k, 1)] + 6 U[G(k, 2)]
where G(k, 1) and G(k, 2) are expenditures by the government in country k in Period 1
and Period 2, respectively, and 6 is the subjective discount factor. For simplicity, we
assume that the tax revenues in the two periods, T(k, 1) and T(k, 2), are exogenously
given. Let B(k) and D(k) are first-period borrowing by country k from international
banks and first-period direct investment in country k, respectively. To abstract from
unnecessary complications, we assume that bank credit and FDI are merely two forms of
additional funding sources. No production is explicitly modeled. In this case, the gap
between the first-period expenditure and tax revenue has to be met by the inflow of
international capital:
G(k, 1) =  T(k, 1) + B(k) + D(k)
5In the second period, the international credit has to be repaid. Moreover,
international direct investors are assumed to recoup both the investment and the gross
profit.
G(k, 2) = T(k, 2) - R[B(k)] B(k) - R[D(k)] D(k)
where R[B(k)] and R[D(k)] are the gross returns that international creditors and
international director investors would demand from country k.  Suppose R* is the gross
return on the risk free bond (say, the U.S. government bond as an approximation), then,
we assume that
R[B(k)] = R* + 0 B(k)
and
R[D(k)] = R* + 0 D(k) + p(k) D(k)
Both 0 and p(k) are positive. p(k) should be thought of proportional to country k's
perceived level of corruption. The positive 0 reflects the assumption that the warranted
retums on either bank credit or direct investment increases with the size of the capital
inflow.  p(k) appears in the return on the direct investment but not in that on bank credit
because corruption represents a greater risk to direct investment than to bank loans (for
the two reasons described in the previous section).
A few points are worth noting here. First, we assume that the bank credit is
obtained and later paid back by the govermnent. Borrowing from international credit
market in reality can be done by either private or public sector. Many researchers have
observed that the distinction between private and public borrowing is very thin since
private borrowing from the international credit market often carries implicit and
sometimes explicit guarantee from the government of the borrowing country. Second,
while direct investment is supposed to be for the "long term," investors eventually would
want to recoup both the initial investment and the cumulative profits along the way.
The government's maximization problem yields the following two first-order
conditions:
6U'[G(k, 1)] - o U'[G(k, 2)] [R* + 2 0 B(k)]  0
and
U'[G(k, 1)] - 6 U'[G(k, 2)] [R* + 2 0 B(k) + 2 p(k) D(k)]  0
This implies a particular relationship between the composition of capital inflow
for country k and its corruption level:
B(k)  / D(k) =[ 0+ p(k) ]/0
Hence, the higher is the corruption level in country k, the less FDI it would
receive relative to its bank borrowing. While this model is very simple and perhaps
overly simplistic, it does capture the basic message relatively well.
3.  Data
The key components of international capital flows in the empirical investigation
are bilateral direct investment and bilateral bank loans. As far as we know, other forms
of capital flows are not available on a bilateral basis for a broad set of capital-exporting
countries examined in this paper.
The bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) data is an average over three
years (1994-96) of the stock of foreign direct investment from 13 source countries to 30
host countries. Table 3 presents a list of all source and host countries in our sample.  The
data come from the OECD's International Direct Investment 1998. [The original data
also have the source countries themselves as the hosts of FDI.  But these country pairs do
not have comparable bilateral lending data. To keep comparability, we restrict our
analysis to those country pairs that are common to both data sets. To reduce year-to-year
fluctuation in the data due to measurement error, we use the simple average over 1994-96
(year-end stocks).
The bilateral bank lending data is an average over three years of the outstanding
loans from 13 lending countries to 83 borrowing countries. After excluding missing
observations, there are altogether 793 country pairs.  IThe  data come from the Bank for
7International Settlement's Consolidated International Claims of BIS Reporting Banks on
Individual countries, and are given in millions of dollars. To reduce measurement errors
in a given year, we use the simple average over three years (1994-96, year-end
outstanding amounts).
For relative extent of corruption across countries, we employ three different
measures.  The first, which we label as the TI Index, is published by Transparency
International, a Germany-based international non-governmental organization devoted to
fight corruption worldwide.  The TI index itself is a weighted average of twelve separate
sources ranging from 1996-98.6 The TI index ranks the extent of corruption on a zero-to-
ten scale.
As a survey of surveys, the TI corruption index has its advantages and
disadvantages. If the measurement errors in each of its component surveys are
independent and identically distributed (iid), the averaging process used to produce the TI
index reduces the measurement error.  On the other hand, the iid assumption may not
hold.  Moreover, since each component of the TI index could have different country
coverage and employ different definitions of corruption, the averaging process could
introduce new measurement errors when cross-country ratings are produced.
The second corruption measure, the GCR Index, is derived from the Global
Competitiveness Report 1997 produced jointly by the Geneva-based World Economic
Forum and Harvard Institute for International Development. The survey for the report
was conducted in late 1996 on 2827 firns in 58 countries. The GCR Survey asked
respondents (in Question 8.02) to rate the level of corruption in their country on a one-to-
seven scale, based on the extent of "irregular, additional payments connected with
imports and exports permits, business licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police
protection or loan applications." The GCR Corruption Index is based on the country
average of the individual ratings.
6 They  are World  Competitiveness  Yearbooks  1996,  1997,  and 1998,  Political  Economic  Risk
Consultancy's Asian Intelligence Issues, 1997 and 1998, Gallup International 50'  Anniversary Survey
1997,  Political Risk Services' ICRG rating 1998, Global Competitiveness Reports 1996, 1997 and 1998,
World Bank's World Development Report Survey 1997, and Economist Intelligence Unit rating 1998. For
details, see http://www.gwdg.de/-uwvw/CPI 1998.htm.
8The third corruption measure, labeled as the WDR Index, is derived from a World
Bank survey in 1996 of 3866 firms in 73 countries in preparation for its World
Development Report 1997. Question 14 of that survey asks: "Is it common for firns  in
my line of business to have to pay some irregular, "additional" payments to get things
done?" The respondents were asked to rate the level of corruption on a one-to-six scale.
The WDR corruption index is based on the country average of the individual answers.
For the three corruption indexes, the original sources are such that a higher
number implies lower corruption. To avoid awkwardness in interpretation, they are re-
scaled in this paper so that a high number now implies high corruption.
Table 4 presents pair-wise correlation coefficients for the three corruption
measures (as well their correlations with per capita GDP). In spite of the different
sources and methodologies, the three corruption measures are fairly highly correlated
with each other, suggesting sufficient consistency in the perception of relative corruption
levels across countries.
We have employed other variables in the statistical analyses.  For details of the
data construction and their sources, please see Appendix A.
4. Statistical Analyses
4.1 Bilateral Foreign Direct Investment
We start with an analysis of the relationship between corruption and foreign direct
investment. Let FDI i k  denote bilateral foreign direct investment from source country j
to host country k.  We adopt a generalized gravity specification:
source country
Log(FDI j k)  =  fixed effects  +  ,B  corruption k +  Xi  kl  +  ej  k
Where f3  and F are scalar and vector parameters, respectively, and Xj k is a vector of
determinants of bilateral FDI other than host country corruption. Specifically,
Xj  k  =  [log(GDP k),  log(GDP k / Population k)  , log(Distance  j k),  Linguistic-Tiej k ]
9Finally, ei k is assumed to be an iid normally distributed variate with a zero mean.
The regression result is presented as column 1 in table 5a. We observe that the
coefficients on the control variables are of sensible signs. Larger host economies tend to
receive more FDI. Host countries that are closer to source countries either in physical
proximity or in linguistic/historical connection also receive more FDI.  Most importantly
for our question, countries that are more corrupt tend to receive less foreign direct
investment. This FDI-depressing effect of corruption is significant not only statistically
(at the 5 percent level) but also economically. A one-step increase in the TI corruption
rating is associated with a 20 percent reduction in inward FDI.  An increase in local
corruption from the Singapore level (TI-index value of 0.9) to the level of Mexico (TI-
index value of 6.7) is associated with a reduction in inward FDI by 68 percent. 7
So far, we have assumed that the error term in the regression is independently
distributed across observations. If there are other host country characteristics that are
important for FDI but omitted from the current specification, it could induce correlation
in the error terms (over observations for a common host country). To investigate the
effect of this type of omitted variables, we also implement a type of random effects
specification which differs from the previous fixed-effects  regression by allowing a host-
country specific component in the error tern.  That is,
source country
Log(FDI  k)  =  fixed effects  +  D corruption k +  X  j kr  +  U k  +  e i k
where u k is host-specific normnal  variate with zero mean, e  j k iS the same as before (iid
across all observations), and u k and e  j k are uncorrelated from each other.
The result of this random-effects regression is reported as column 2 in table 5a.
The qualitative results of all coefficients remain the same as before. The effect of
corruption on FDI remains negative and statistically significant. If anything, the point
estimate of the effect has become even larger.
7exp{-0.199  X  (6.7-0.9)}  - = -0.68.
10Since the corruption rating that we have used is based on subjective survey
responses, it is useful to check for robustness of our finding by using alternative
corruption ratings. Specifically, we replicate our key regressions by replacing the TI
corruption rating with the ratings from the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) and
World Development Report (WDR), respectively. Unlike a typical component of the TI
rating, which is based on a survey of (a single) expert, both GCR and WDR ratings are
derived by averaging over individual responses in large firm-level surveys.
The regression results are reported as columns 3-6 in table 5a. The most
important observation to make is that corruption depresses FDI no matter which measure
of corruption is used.  In three out of four regressions, the coefficient on corruption is
negative and statistically significant. The remaining insignificant coefficient still has a
negative sign and an economically  big coefficient.
When we use log(FDI) as the dependent variable, those bilateral FDI observations
that are zero are dropped from the regressions.  To see if our result is qualitatively
affected by including zero-FDI observations, we also use log(FDI+O.  1) as the dependent
variable and replicate all the previous regressions. The results are reported as table 5b.
Overall, the results in this new specification (with slightly more observations) are very
similar to before.
4.2 Bilateral Bank Loans
We now proceed to examine the connection between corruption level in a
developing country and its borrowing from the industrial countries.  For easy comparison
with the results on FDI, we start with a generalized gravity specification with source
country fixed effects like before:
source country
Log(Loan  j k)  =  fixed effects  +  ,B  corruption k + X j kr  + e j k
where Loan j  is the bilateral loan from lending country j to borrowing country k. P and F
are scalar and vector parameters, respectively. And Xj k is a vector of determinants of
11bilateral loans other than host country corruption. The regression result is reported as
column 1 in table 6a.  In contrast to the earlier result on FDI (which is discouraged by
host country corruption), the coefficient on corruption in this regression is not statistically
different from zero. Thus, a corrupt country experiences no apparent disadvantage in
terms of securing bank loans from developed countries.
Similar to our discussion on FDI, we proceed to run an alternative (random-
effects) specification that allows part of the error term to be host-country specific:
source country
Log(Loan j k)  =  fixed effects  +  P corruption k +  X j kF  +  U k +  e j k
where u k is host-specific normal variate with zero mean, e i k iS the same as before (iid
across all observations), and u  k and ej k are uncorrelated to each other. The result is
reported as column 2 in table 6a.  The coefficient estimates are qualitatively similar to
those from the fixed-effects regression.  In particular, the coefficient on corruption
remains indifferent from zero even at the 15 percent level.
As a robustness check, we replicate the above fixed-effects and random-effects
regressions using the two alternative measures of corruption, namely, the GCR and WDR
indexes. The regression results are reported in the last four columns of table 6a.  As it
turns out, the sign of the coefficient on corruption is sensitive to the choice of corruption
measure. When the GCR index is employed, more corrupt countries on average attract
more bank loans from developed countries than otherwise identical borrowing countries.
This is true for both fixed- and random-effects specifications. When the WDR index is
employed, the effect of corruption on loans is either zero (in the case of a fixed-effects
regression) or negative (in the case of a random-effects regression).  The pair-wise
correlation coefficients among the three measures of corruption are high (see table 4).
Scatter plots of one corruption measure against another do not reveal any obvious outliers
either.  So we do not have an intuitive explanation for why the three different corruption
measures produce different results.  Table 6b reports some Tobit regressions, which turn
out to have qualitatively very similar results as the corresponding fixed-effects
regressions.
12To summarize, in contrast to the earlier results on FDI, most regressions (five out
of six in table 6a) suggest that corrupt countries are not disadvantaged in obtaining bank
loans from developed countries.  Some regressions even suggest the opposite. Finally, it
is useful to note that in the only case (last regression) where the corruption coefficient is
negative, the absolute value of the point estimate (-0.34) is smaller than the
corresponding estimate for the effect of corruption on FDI (-0.97, in the last regression of
table 5a). This suggests that corruption in developing countries discourages FDI more
than bank loans. We formally test this hypothesis in the next subsection.
4.3 Ratio of bank loans to FDI
The central question of the paper is whether corruption affects the composition of
capital inflows.  So we now examine whether the ratio of bank loans to FDI is affected by
local corruption.
We proceed as before starting with a fixed-effects regression using the TI-index
as the measure of corruption:
source country
Log(Loan i k / FDI j k)  =  fixed effects  +  ,B  corruption k +  X j kr  + e i k
The regression result is reported in column 1 in table 7a.  As expected, the
coefficient on corruption is positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Hence, a corrupt country tends to have a composition of capital inflows that is relatively
light in FDI and relatively heavy in bank loans.
Also note that because FDI is more relationship-intensive (as proxied by physical
and linguistic distances) than bank loans, the coefficients on geographic distance and the
linguistic tie dummy are positive and negative, respectively, in this regression which
examines the determinants of the loan-to-FDI ratio.
We proceed with a slew of robustness checks employing alternative measures of
corruption (GCR and WDR) and alternative specification (i.e., random-effects).  The
results are reported in the last five columns of tables 7a and 7b. The qualitative results
are similar.  In particular, the coefficient estimate on the corruption variable in each of
the six regressions is positive and statistically significant. Hence, the evidence is
13overwhelming and robust that corrupt countries tend to have a particular structure of
capital inflows characterized by a relatively light foreign direct investment.
4.4 Instrumental Variable Regressions
One might be concerned with endogeneity of the corruption measure.  For
example, if survey respondents may perceive a country to be corrupt in part because they
observe very little FDI going there. In this case, the negative association between the
FDI-to-loan ratio and corruption is due to the reverse causality. This is of a particular
concem here since our reliable measures of corruption were derived in 1996 or later,
whereas the most recent FDI and loan data (on a bilateral basis) are from 1996 or earlier.
In this subsection, we perform instrumental variable (IV) regressions on our key
regressions. Mauro (1995) argued that ethnolinguistic fragmentation is a good IV for
corruption.  His ethnolinguistic indicator measures the probability that two persons from
a country are from two distinct ethnic groups. The greater the indicator, the more
fragmented the country. Table 8a reports the regressions of our corruption measures on a
constant (not reported) and the same measure of ethnolinguistic fragmentation as Mauro.
The slope coefficient is positive and statistically significant: the greater the heterogeneity
in the population, the greater the corruption on average.
In table 8b, we add one more regressor, namely, the extent of democracy. This
variable is also statistically significant. More democracy means less corruption.  The
reason seems intuitive. More democracy means more accountability (either through
check-and-balances across different branches of government, or through greater
responsiveness of the govermnent to people, or both).  And more accountability implies
less corruption. It is interesting to observe that once one controls for democracy, the
ethnolinguistic fragmentation variable is no longer statistically significant.
In table 9, we re-do some of the key regressions in tables 5-7 using the fitted
value of regression (1) in table 8b as the instrumented value of corruption.8 Now there is
some weak evidence that corrupt countries may also receive less bank loans (columns 1
and 2).  They still receive significantly less FDI (columns 3-4). Most importantly,
14because corruption deters FDI more than bank loans, countries that are more corrupt tend
to have a capital inflow structure that relies relatively more on bank borrowing and less
on FDI.
4.5 Portfolio and Direct Investments from the United States
While bilateral data on portfolio investment other than bank credits are not
available for the whole set of capital-exporting countries examined in the previous sub-
sections, we can obtain data on portfolio investment from the United States (to a set of
developing countries). In this subsection, we use the data on United States outward
capital flows to examine whether the portfolio-to-direct investment ratio in a capital-
receiving country is affected by its corruption level.
We again perform fixed-effects and random-effects regressions pruning the
relationship between portfolio-investmnent-to  FDI ratio.  The results are reported in table
10. We see again that, at least for this sub-sample, the portfolio-investment-to-FDI ratio
is also positively related to the capital-importing country's corruption level.  The corrupt
a country is, the less FDI it tends to receive relative to portfolio capital.
5.  Conclusions
Corrupt countries receive less foreign direct investment. On the other hand,
corrupt countries may not be disadvantaged in obtaining bank loans (or at least not by as
much). As a result, corruption in a capital-importing country tends to tilt the composition
of its capital inflows away from foreign direct investment and towards foreign bank
loans. The data supports this hypothesis. Furthermore, the effect of corruption on the
ratio of borrowing from foreign banks to inward FDI is robust across different measures
of corruption and different econometric specifications.
There are two possible reasons for this effect. First, foreign direct investments are
more likely to be exploited by local corrupt officials ex post than foreign loans.  As a
8  The same  IV  regressions  with alternative  measures  of corruption  (GCR,  WDR,  and BI)  will produce
similar  results  for the second  stage  regression,  since  they are all linear  combination  of the same
15result, fewer FDI would go to a corrupt countries ex ante. Second, the current
international financial architecture is such that there is more insurance/protection from
the IMF and the G7 governments for bank lenders from developed countries than for
direct investors.
Previous research (starting with Frankel and Rose 1996) has shown that a capital
inflow structure that is relatively low in FDI is associated with a greater propensity for
future currency crisis. It may be that international bank loans (or other portfolio flows)
swing more than direct investment in the event of a bad news (real, or self-generated by
the international investors) about economic or policy fundamentals. If so, this paper has
provided evidence for one possible channel through which corruption in a developing
country may increase its chances of running into a future crisis.
In the literature on the causes of currency crises, crony capitalism and self-
fulfilling expectations by international creditors are often proposed as two rival
hypotheses.  Indeed, authors that subscribe to one view often do not accept the other.
The evidence in this paper suggests a natural linkage between the two.  Crony capitalism,
through its effect on the composition of a country's capital inflows, make it more
vulnerable to self-fulfilling expectations type of currency crisis.
Corruption could also lead to a financial crisis by weakening domestic financial
supervision and producing a deteriorated quality of banks' and firms' balance sheets.
This possibility itself can be a topic for a useful research project.
instuments.
16References
Bardhan, Pranab, 1997, "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of
Economic Literature, Vol. XXXV (September): 1320-1346.
Frankel and Rose, 1996, "Currency Crashes in Emerging Markets: An Empirical
Treatment," Journal of International Economics, v41 n3-4 (November): 351-66.
Hines, James, 1995, "Forbidden Payment: Foreign Bribery and American Business After
1977," NBER Working Paper 5266, September.
Kaufmnann,  Daniel, 1997, "Corruption: some Myths and Facts," Foreign Policy, Summer:
114-131.
Kaufmnann,  Daniel and Shang-Jin Wei, 1999, "Does 'Grease Payment'  Speed Up the
Wheels of Commerce?" National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper
7093.
Mauro, Paolo, 1995, "Corruption and Growth, "Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110:
681-712.
McKinnon, Ronald, and Huw Pill, 1996, "Credible Liberalization and International
Capital Flows: The Overborrowing Syndrome," in Takatoshi Ito and Anne 0.
Krueger eds., Financial Deregulation and Integration in East Asia, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, pp 7-45.
McKinnon, Ronald, and Huw Pill, 1999, "Exchange Rate Regimes for Emerging
Markets: Moral Hazard and International Overborrowing," Stanford University
and Harvard University. Forthcoming, Oxford Review of Economic Policy.
OECD, 1998, International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook, Paris: OECD
Publication. [There is an associated data diskette.]
Radelet, Steven, and Jeffrey Sachs, 1998, "The East Asian Financial Crisis: Diagnosis,
Remedies, and Prospects, " Brookings Papers on Economic Activities.
Razin, Assaf, Efraim Sadka, and Chi-Wa Yuen, 1998, "A Pecking Order of Capital
Inflows and International Tax Principles," Journal of International Economics,
44.
Reisen, Helmut, 1999, "The Great Asian Slump," OECD Development Center.
Rodrik, Dani, and Andres Velasco, 1999, "Short-Term Capital Flows," Paper prepared
for the 1999 World Bank Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics.
Harvard University and New York University.
Tomell, Aaron, 1990, "Real vs. Financial Investment:  Can Tobin Taxes Eliminate the
Irreversibility Distortion?" Journal of Development Economics 32: 419-444.
Wei, Shang-Jin, 1997, "How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors?"  NBER
Working Paper 6030.  Forthcoming, Review of Economics and Statistics,
November, 1999.
Wei, Shang-Jin, 1999, "Corruption in Economic Development: Beneficial Grease, Minor
Annoyance, or Major Obstacle?"  Policy Research Working Paper 2048,
Development Research Group, World Bank Policy, Washington, D.C. February.
17Appendix:  Source and Construction of the Variables
Bilateral Bank Loans
Source: Bank for International Settlements
CONSOLIDATED INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS OF BIS REPORTING BANKS ON
INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES;(in millions of U.S. dollars); Semi-annual International Banking
Statistics;International claims by nationality of reporting banks on countries outside the reporting
area;(in millions of U.S. dollars);End-December.  Data loans to offshore banking centers are
dropped.
Bilateral Foreign Direct Investment
Source: OECD, International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook 1998, Diskettes.  In millions
of US$ (converted into $ using the yearly average exchange rates from the book: Annex III).
Distance
Greater Circle Distance between economic centers in a pair of countries based on the latitute and
longitude data.
Source for latitude and longitude: Rudloff/Pearce, Watlas, Gale
The distance (in kilometers) between the capital cities.
The primary source is Rudloff, updated from Pearce, Watlas
Argentina: used the average of Buenos Aires, Cordoba, and Rosario
Australia: used the average of Canberra, Sydney, and Melbourne
Bahrain: used the data from the city of Muharraq
Bermuda: used the data from Kindley Air Force Base
Bhutan: the figure is from http://www.kingdomofbhutan.com/kingdom.html
Canada: used the average of Toronto, Vancouver, and Montreal
Equatorial Guinea: used the data from the city of Santa Isabel
Greenland: used the data from the city of Peary Land
India: used the average of New Delhi, Bombay, and Calcutta
Israel: used the data from Lod Airport (near Java and Tel Aviv)
Mauritius: used the data from the city of Diego Gracia
Netherlands: used the data from the city of De Bilt
Slovak: used the data from the city of Poprad
Sudan: used the average of Atbara Khartoum and El Fasher
Switzerland: used the data from the city of Zurich
Belize: the data are from Belmopan (capital)
Brazil: used the average of Brasilia, Rio de Janeiro, and Sao Paulo. The data for Brasilia is from
Watlas
Panama: used the data from Panama city
Russia: used the average of Moscow, St. Petersburg and Nizhni Novogorodo.
The data for Nzhni Novogorodo is from http://www.unn.runnet.ru/nn/whereis.htm
Kazakhstan: used the average of Almaty, Chimkent, and Karaganda. The data for chimkent are
from Watlas
Tajikistan: the data are from Watlas
United States: used the data from Kansas City, Missouri.
Distance between Taiwan and the lending countries are from Shang-jin Wei's web site:
www.nber.org/-wei
18Linguistic Tie
Source on major languages: Shang-Jin Wei's website (see above) and CIA world facts book
Dummy = 1 if the two countries share a common language or have a former colonial relation.
Used the data from Shang-jin Wei's web site wherever data available except:
Kuwait (English): follow CIA where English is listed as widely spoken.
Libya (add Italian): In addition to English, Italian is listed in CIA.
Others: from CIA world fact book.
For African countries, used the official languages except Namibia (German), Mauritania
(French), Mauritius(English, French, English is the official language).
Others included although not main language: Costa Rica (English, main language is
Spanish), Dominica (French), Trinidad/Tobago (French, Spanish), Oman (English), Qatar
(English), Brunei (English), Papua New Guinea (English), Jordan (English), Israel (English); Sri
Lanka (English),
Corruption  -- TI Index
Source: Transparency International (http://www.gwdg.de/-uwvw/icr.htm),  the 1998 index.
Transformation: Value in this paper = 10 minus the original values.  Thus, a smaller number
means less corrupt government.
Corruption - GCR Index
Original source: Global Competitiveness Report 1997
Transformation:  value in this paper = 8 - original values.
Corruption  - WDR Index
Original source: survey for the 1997 World Development Report
Transformation: value in this paper = 8 - original values.
See: Kaufmann and Wei (1999), "Does 'Grease Payment' Speed Up the Wheels of Commerce?"
NBER Working Paper 7093.
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and GDP Per Capita
Source: World Bank Sima/WDI99 Database
GDP at market prices (constant 1995 US$).
Log(GDP) calculated as Ln(GDP94 + GDP95 + GDP96)/3. Log(per capita GDP) calculated as
Ln [(gdp94/pop94+gdp95/pop95+gdpO6/pop96)/3].  Exceptions: two year average if the value for
the third year is missing.
19Corruption and international capital flow
Table 1: Standard Deviations of  FDI/GDP, Bank Loans/GDP, and Portfolio Flow/GDP (1980-96)
FDI/GDP  Loans/GDP  Ptf/GDP
OECD countries
Mean  0.0073  0.0208  0.0199
Median  0.0062  0.0174  0.0192
Emerging markets: 73 countries
Mean  0.0218  0.0437  0.0109
Median  0.0102  0.0346  0.0037
Whole sample: 93 countries
Mean  0.019  0.039  0.013
Median  0.009  0.033  0.009
Selected countries
Indonesia  0.007  0.017  0.009
Korea  0.002  0.037  0.014
Malaysia  0.023  0.034  0.023
Mexico  0.007  0.033  0.026
Philippines  0.009  0.026  0.017
Thailand  0.007  0.028  0.012
Note: Samples include only countries that have at least eight non-missing observations during 1980-1996
for all three variables.
Source:  Total inward FDI flows, total bank loans, and total inward portfolio investments: IMF Balance of
Payment Statistics; GDP: World Bank's GDF & WDI central Databases.
Table 2: Quality of Public Governance and the Composition of Capital Inflows
New Zealand  Singapore  Uruguay  Thailand
Corruption  0.6  0.9  5.7  7.0
(Ti Index)  (less corrupt)  (more corrupt)
Loan / FDI  0.11  0.44  1.77  5.77
Portfolio / FDI  0.07  0.09  1.40  1.76
Loan  9.20E+08  1.05E+10  7.94E+08  2.50E+09
Portfolio  6.  1OE+08  2.20E+09  6.27E+08  7.61E+08
FDI  8.40E+09  2.36E+10  4.48E+08  4.32E+08
Note: The lower half of the table reports the absolute amount of the three inflows in U.S. dollars.
Source: total inward loans, portfolio investment, and FDI are from the IMF's
Balance of Payment Statistics.  The reported numbers are averages over three years
(1994-96).
20Table 3: List of Countries in the Sample
Source countries of FDI and lending countries of loan:
Austria,  Germany,  Spain,
Belgium,  Italy,  United Kingdom,
Canada,  Japan,  United States
Finland,  Luxembourg,
France,  the Netherlands,
Host countries of loan and FDI (FDI data only available for *countries):
Albania, Argentina*,  Bissau, Honduras, Hungary*,  Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru,
Armenia, Australia*,  Iceland*, India*, Indonesia*,  Philippines*, Poland,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Benin,  Islamic Rep., Israel*,  Portugal, Romania*, Russian
Bolivia, Brazil*, Bulgaria*,,  Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan,  Federation*, Senegal, Siovak
Cameroon, Chad, Chile*,  Kenya, Korea, Rep.*, Kyrgyz  Republic*, South Africa*,
China*, Colombia*, Congo,  Republic, Latvia, Lithuania,  Taiwan*, Tanzania,
Rep., Costa Rica*, Cote d'  Madagascar, Malawi,  Thailand*, Tonga, Tunisia,
Ivoire, Czech Republic*,  Malaysia*, Mali, Mauritius,  Turkey*, Uganda, Ukraine*,
Ecuador, Egypt, Arab Rep.*,  Mexico*, Moldova,  Uruguay, Uzbekistan,
El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji,  Morocco*, Mozambique,  Venezuela*, Vietnam,
Georgia, Ghana, Greece*,  Namibia, New Zealand*,  Zambia, Zimbabwe
Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-  Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria,
Table 4: Correlation Matrix
GDP96  ti  gcr97  wdr97
GDP96  1
ti  -0.2147  1
gcr97  -0.2680  0.8689  1
wdr97  -0.2465  0.8636  0.8305  1
21Table 5a:  Corruption  and  Bilateral  Foreign  Direct  Investment
Dependent  variable:  ti  gcr97  wdr97
Fixed'  Fixed  Fixed
Effects  Random 2 Effects  Random  Effects  Random
Log(average FDI)  OLS  Effects  OLS  Effects  OLS  Effects
Corruption  -0.199**  -0.257**  -0.214**  -0.214  -0.967**  -0.967**
(0.081)  (0.122)  (0.107)  (0.158)  (0.245)  (0.245)
Log average gdp of 94-
96  1.312**  1.521**  1.044**  1.243**  0.988**  0.988**
(0.107)  (0.15)  (0.111)  (0.154)  (0.142)  (0.142)
Log average gdp per  0.113  0.044  0.144  0.17  0.232  0.232
capita of 94-96  (0.142)  (0.221)  (0.111)  (0.166)  (0.208)  (0.208)
Log distance between  -0.615**  -1.065**  -0.535**  -0.972**  -0.912**  -0.912**
the two countries  (0.118)  (0.128)  (0.115)  (0.128)  (0.149)  (0.149)
Linguistic tie  1.042**  1.054**  0.793**  0.906**  1.157**  1.157**
(0.374)  (0.328)  (0.376)  (0.338)  (0.526)  (0.526)
Adjusted R2/ Overall R 2 0.59  0.59  0.58  0.58  0.58  0.62
No. of obs.  262  262  242  242  147  147
Breusch and Pagan test
Prob>chi2
5
0.00  0.00  0.00
Hausman test
Prob>chi2
6 0.00  0.00  0.00
**Significant at 5%, *significant at 10%, #significant at 15%. Standard errors in parentheses.
Adjusted R 2 for OLS and Overall R2  for Random effect respectively.
Breusch and Pagan lagrangian multiplier test for random effects. Ho: Var(u) = 0.
Hausman specification test.  Ho: E[e(ij)IX(ij)] = 0.
The estimated Var(u) = 0.  The Breusch and Pagan test does not perform well under such circumstance.
Note:  1. Fixed effect OLS: Y(ij) = dummy(i) + bX(ij) + e(ij); i: source country index, j: host country
index. All regression have a country dummy for all source countries except United States. Not reported to
save space.
2. Random effect: Y(ij) = dummy(i) + bX(ij) + u(j) + e(ij).
22Table  5b: Corruption  and  Bilateral  Foreign  Direct  Investment
(With Tobit Regressions)
Dependent
variable:  ti  Gcr97  wdr97
Log average  Fixed  Fixed'  Random  Fixed  Fixed  Random  Fixed  Fixed  Random
FDI + 0.1  Effects  Effects  Effects  Effects  Effects  Effects  Effects  Effects  Effects
OLS  Tobit  OLS  Tobit  OLS  Tobit
Corruption  -0.17*  -0.164*  -0.268#  -0.211*  -0.216*  -0.208  -0.858**  -0.856**  -1.035**
(0.09)  (0.090)  (0.167)  (0.121)  (0.120)  (0.227)  (0.283)  (0.274)  (0.469)
Log average  1.375**  1.390**  1.645**  1.14**  1.160**  1.395**  0.992**  0.997**  1.162**
GDP of 94-96  (0.118)  (0.118)  (0.2)  (0.124)  (0.123)  (0.214)  (0.164)  (0.158)  (0.253)
Log average gdp  0.104  0.103  0.02  0.12  0.107  0.185  0.423*  0.434*  . 0.373
Per capita of 94-96  (0.159)  (0.158)  (0.307)  (0.125)  (0.124)  (0.24)  (0.24)  (0.232)  (0.411)
Log distance  -0.621**  -0.628**  -1.255**  -0.535**  -0.544**  -1.188**  -0.823**  -0.822**  -1.339**
countries  (0.131)  (0.131)  (0.142)  (0.13)  (0.129)  (0.146)  (0.172)  (0.166)  (0.183)
Linguistic tie  1.194**  1.209**  1.131**  0.949**  0.955**  1.002**  1.404**  1.416**  1.168**
(0.419)  (0.417)  (0.346)  (0.432)  (0.428)  (0.359)  (0.609)  (0.588)  (0.524)
R2  0.56  0.18  0.55  0.54  0.17  0.53  0.51  0.17  0.53
No. of obs.  269  269  269  248  248  248  150  150  150
Breusch and Pagan
test Prob>chi2 5 0.00  0.00  0.00
Hausman test
Prob>chi2  0.00  0.00  0.00
1.  Fixed effect tobit: Y(ij) = dunmmy(i)  + bX(ij) + e(ij); i: source country index, j: host country index.
2. Adjusted R 2 for OLS, Pseudo R2 for tobit, and Overall R2for Random effect respectively.
Table 6a: Corruption  and  Bilateral  Bank  Loans
Dependent variable:  ti  gcr97  wdr97
Log(average loan)  Fixed  Random  Fixed  Random  Fixed  Random
Effects  Effects  Effects  Effects  Effects  Effects
OLS  OLS  OLS
Corruption  0.03  -0.012  0.216**  0.226**  -0.159  -0.34*
-0.045  -0.079  -0.063  -0.091  -0.113  -0.178
Log average GDP of  1.004**  1.055**  0.946**  0.958**  1.069**  1.112**
94-96  -0.04  -0.069  -0.044  -0.061  -0.053  -0.086
Log average GDP per  0.271**  0.165  0.358**  0.343**  0.17*  -0.035
capita of 94-96  -0.074  -0.128  -0.062  -0.089  -0.091  (0.146)
Log distance between  -0.322**  -0.738**  -0.234**  -0.458**  -0.365**  -0.771**
the two countries  -0.065  -0.08  -0.07  -0.082  -0.089  (0.105)
Linguistic tie  0.759**  0.887**  0.673**  0.896**  1.08**  1.107**
(0.163)  (0.148)  (0.197)  (0.185)  (0.205)  (0.185)
Adjusted R 2 i Overall
R2  0.69  0.67  0.72  0.72  0.66  0.65
No. of obs.  669  669  450  450  483  483
Breusch and Pagan
test Prob>chi25 0.00  0.00  0.00
Hausman test
Prob>chi2  0.00  0.00  0.00
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Dependent variable:  ti  gcr97  wdr97
Log(loan + 0.1)  Fixed  Fixed  Random  Fixed  Fixed  Random  Fixed  Fixed  Random
Effects  Effects  Effects  Effects  Effects  Effects  Effects  Effects  Effects
OLS  Tobit  OLS  Tobit  OLS  Tobit
Corruption  -0.061  -0.070  -0.1  0.228**  0.222**  0.203  -0.619** -0.685** -0.791**
(0.059)  (0.068)  (0.111)  (0.086)  (0.090)  (0.182)  (0.13)  (0.185)  (0.249)
Log average  1.363**  1.497**  1.41**  1.154**  1.211**  1.204**  1.477**  1.880**  1.514**
GDP of 94-96  (0.051)  (0.059)  (0.097)  (0.056)  (0.059)  (0.117)  (0.06)  (0.087)  (0.12)
Log average GDP per  0.168*  0.195*  0.05  0.478**  0.505**  0.398**  0.046  0.175 . -0.158
capita of 94-96  (0.096)  (0.111)  (0.179)  (0.084)  (0.088)  (0.177)  (0.107)  (0.152)  (0.205)
Log distance between  -0.37**  -0.456** -0.976** -0.341** -0.378** -0.962**  -0.378** -0.505** -0.986**
the two countries  (0.087)  (0.100)  (0.108)  (0.095)  (0.099)  (0.118)  (0.112)  (0.154)  (0.137)
Linguistic tie  1.327**  1.505**  1.304**  1.277**  1.384**  1.284**  1.884**  2.730**  1.656**
(0.213)  (0.246)  (0.191)  (0.264)  (0.277)  (0.234)  (0.243)  (0.346)  (0.223)
R'  0.68  0.21  0.67  0.67  0.22  0.65  0.68  0.22  0.67
No. of obs.  793  793  793  483  483  483  742  742  742
Breusch and Pagan
test Prob>chi2 5 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Hausman test
Prob>chi2  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01
Table 7: Corruption  and Composition  of Capital  Inflows
Dependent variable:  ti  gcr97  wdr97
Log (Loan/FDI)  Fixed  Random  Fixed  Random  Fixed  Random
Effects  Effects  Effects  Effects  Effects  Effects
OLS  OLS  OLS
Corruption  0.282**  0.288**  0.401**  0.387**  1.181**  1.214**
(0.072)  (0.121)  (0.091)  (0.154)  (0.207)  (0.304)
Log average GDP of 94-96  -0.388**  -0.45**  -0.11  -0.174  -0.009  0.005
(0.095)  (0.148)  (0.095)  (0.148)  (0.12)  (0.167)
Log average GDP per capita  0.15  0.201  0.092  0.108  0.193  0.199
Of 94-96  (0.126)  (0.221)  (0.095)  (0.162)  (0.176)  (0.266)
Log distance between the two  0.388**  0.558**  0.331**  0.53**  0.682**  0.731**
countries  (0.105)  (0.119)  (0.098)  (0.116)  (0.126)  (0.139)
Linguistic tie  -0.828**  -0.72**  -0.69**  -0.676**  -0.669#  -0.544
Adjusted R2/ Overall R2 0.34  0.36  0.36  0.39  0.45  0.51
No. of obs.  261  261  241  241  146  146
Breusch and Pagan test
Prob>chi2
5
0.00  0.00  0.00
Hausman test Prob>chi2  0.84  0.92  0.001
24Table 8a: First Stage of the IV Regressions
ti  gcr97  wdr97  bi
Ethnolinguistic  0.035**  0.013*  0.013*  0.029**
Fractionalization  -0.009  -0.008  -0.008  -0.01
Adjusted R2  0.16  0.04  0.15  0.1
No. of Obs.  70  50  50  66
Note: A constant is inclued in the regression. Not reported to save space.
Table 8b: First Stage of the IV Regressions
ti  gcr97  wdr97  bi
Ethnolinguistic  0.035**  0.013*  0.013*  0.029**
Fractionalization  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.01)
Adjusted R2 0.16  0.04  0.15  0.10
No. of Obs.  70  50  50  66
Ethnolinguistic  0.0005  -0.002  0.004  0.014
Fractionalization  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.01)
Democracy index 1993  0.53**  0.275**  0.114**
(0.079)  (0.062)  (0.043)
Democracy index 1983  0.31**
Adjusted R 2 0.49  0.31  0.22  0.28
No. of Obs.  68  48  49  63
Table 9: IV Regressions on Composition of Capital Inflows
Dependent variables:  log FDI  log Loan  Log(FDI/Loan)
Fixed  Random  Fixed  Random  Fixed  Random
Effects  Effects  Effects  Effects  Effects  Effects
OLS  OLS  OLS
Intrumentedwdr97
2 -0.605*  -1.012*  -0.168  -0.208  0.793**  1.228**
(0.341)  (0.531)  (0.152)  (0.223)  (0.328)  (0.615)
Log average gdp of 94-96  1.276**  1.524**  1.059**  1.084**  -0.333**  -0.476**
(0.119)  (0.183)  (0.040)  (0.058)  (0.114)  (0.212)
Log average gdp per  0.083  -0.007  0.184**  0.169*  0.074  0.189
capita of 94-96  (0.145)  (0.234)  (0.062)  (0.091)  (0.139)  (0.273)
Log distance between  -0.158  -0.783**  -0.541**  -0.851**  -0.126  0.241
The two countries  (0.159)  (0.172)  (0.087)  (0.102)  (0.153)  (0.170)
Linguistic tie  0.604*  0.706**  0.680**  0.837**  -0.705**  -0.504*
(0.349)  (0.303)  (0.141)  (0.134)  (0.335)  (0.291)
Adjusted r2  /overall  r2 0.65  0.65  0.70  0.71  0.37  0.39
No. Of obs.  197  197  708  708  197  197
Breusch and Pagan test  0.00  0.00  0.00
Prob>chi2 5
Hausman test Prob>chi2  0.00  0.00  0.95
1. The results are similar if use (Loan+0.1) and (FDI+0.1).
2. From table 6b, the correlation between wdr97 and instrumented wdr is 0.51
25Table 10: Portfolio versus Direct Investment from the United States
Dependent variable  Ti  GCR97  WDR97  GCR97iv
Log (Portfolio/FDI flow)
Corruption  0.118  0.225*  -0.268  0.152
(0.103)  (0.121)  (0.183)  (0.146)
LogGDP  0.290**  0.305**  0.296**  0.317**
(0.124)  (0.138)  (0.121)  (0.112)
Log GDP percapita  0.514**  0.508**  0.079  0.331**
(0.164)  (0.100)  (0.155)  (0.071)
Log distance  -0.197**  -0.200*  -0.162*  -0.236**
(0.085)  (0.101)  (0.082)  (0.091)
Linguistic tie  0.855**  0.872**  0.687**  0.510**
(0.269)  (0.238)  (0.296)  (0.207)
Constant  -9.322**  -9.857**  -4.685  -7.911  **
(4.443)  (4.425)  (3.308)  (3.420)
No. Of Obs.  39  39  21  37
R 2 0.52  0.67  0.66  0.69
1. Average of FDI flow of 94-96
2. Instrument of WDR97 constructed by EFL and Demorcracy93.
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